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Daily Herald Co. v. Munro: 9th Circuit
Strikes Down Limits on Election Day
Broadcast of Exit Polls
The broadcast of east coast voting returns before the polls
have closed in other time zones has caused considerable debate
over the media's social responsibility.' It has also led two states
to enact legislation limiting the media's access to the polling
place.2 Arguably, these returns give west coast voters the im-
pression that however they vote, their votes will not count be-
cause the result has already been decided. Consequently,
1. See generally, Note, Exit Polls and the First Amendment, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1927, 1928-30 (1985); Note, Curtailment of Early Election Predictions: Can We Predict
the Outcome?, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 489, 491-92 (1984) (for relevant statistics as to effects
on actual outcomes). As Congress stated in H.R. Con. Res. 395, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1984), "[i]n 1980, 3 percentum of registered voters in the western United States re-
ported that they did not go to the polls because of early election predictions by televi-
sion and radio... [and] countless eyewitnesses reported individuals leaving polling
places following announcements by broadcasters of a projected Presidential winner
.... Early election predictions do not serve any significant societal purpose and are
unnecessary and potentially damaging to the political process and voter
participation."
2. Two states have passed legislation addressing this problem. Washington's
statute, WASH. REv. CODE § 29.51.020(1)(d), (1)(e) (1983), is the subject of the opinion
discussed in this Comment. Florida's legislation, similar to Washington's, FLA. STAT.
§ 104.36 (1983), was found to be unconstitutional. Clean-Up 84 v. Heinrich, 590 F.
Supp. 928 (M.D. Fla. 1984) (The court did not specifically reach the issue of whether
delaying of election returns was a permissible purpose.).
Congressional proposals that did not become law include: S. 762, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 2483 (1981), that sought to require networks to delay election-
night predictions; H.R. 3557, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 2167 (1981), that
sought to establish a uniform poll closing time prior to which networks would volun-
tarily withhold exit poll results; and H.R. 3556, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), that pro-
posed sealing ballots in elections until all polling places were closed. Logistical and
constitutional problems may have been the death of these legislative efforts. See
Note, Exit Polls and the First Amendmen4 98 HARv. L. REv. 1927, 1943-44 (1985).
Congress realized that making poll closing times uniform may be useless because net-
works would still be able to produce predictions within hours after the polls opened.
Thus whatever Congress did would necessitate the cooperation of the media. See H.R.
Con. Res. 321, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. 2063 (1984).
The last word from the Congress was a congressional resolution asking, but not
telling, the media to delay election night predictions until all of the polls have closed.
H.R& Con. Res. 321, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. 2063 (1984) (does not carry
force of law and imposes no penalties for noncompliance, unless signed by the
President).
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voters may choose not to vote at all, leading to a different elec-
toral result or at least a skewed result.3
This commentary discusses the basis for a recent decision of
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Daily Herald Co. v.
Munro,4 which may sound the death knell for legislation that
would seek to limit election day broadcasting.
In Daily Herald the court held 5 that if the purpose of a
Washington state statute which prohibited conducting exit
polls of voters within 300 feet of the entrance to a polling place
was to prevent broadcasting of early election returns, it was un-
constitutional. Since it was the early returns from the East
that were the primary motivation for this legislation, and this
legislation only prevented the broadcasting of Washington's
own early returns, the State's purpose was not manifest in the
statute anyway. Consequently, the statute failed to provide any
justification for what the court decided was an otherwise im-
permissible restraint on speech.7 The court also found, how-
ever, that the state's desire to insulate voters from outside
influences is insufficient to justify the regulation of speech.'
Such legislation would not be upheld absent a showing that en-
suring the integrity of every citizen's vote is a compelling state
interest.' A compelling state interest is required here because
the legislation is not content neutral, and, hence, presumptively
constitutes impermissible discrimination against certain types
3. See H.R. Con. Res. 321, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984): "(1) in the 1980 and 1982
general elections, broadcasters made projections of election results in many states
while polls were still open; (2) those projections may have decreased voter participa-
tion and affected close elections."
4. 838 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988).
5. The court also found subsection 1(e) of WASH. REv. CODE § 29.51.020, to be
neither narrowly tailored to accomplish a compelling government interest. Id. at 385,
nor, even if it were content neutral, to be a reasonable time, place and manner regula-
tion. Id. at 386. It also found the purpose of protecting voters from broadcasting of
early returns to not be sufficiently narrowly tailored. Id. at 387. The Court, however,
did not address subsection 1(d) of the Code, which more narrowly prohibited "en-
gag[ing] in any practice which interferes with the freedom of voters to exercise their
franchise or disrupts the administration of the polling place." Id at 384.
6. Id. at 387 n.10. The court found that even if the purpose was not to prevent
the broadcasting of early returns, the statute was unconstitutional on its face.
7. Id. at 387. In any event, as the Daily Herald court points out at 387 n.11, even
if state legislation were constitutional, any legislation would have to come from the
federal government since the federal government generally regulates broadcasting.
See National Assn. of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. F.C.C., 746 F.2d 1492, 1499 (D.C.
Cir. 1984).
8. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 387.
9. Id. at 385.
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of speech.'
Upholding the integrity of the electoral process is an impor-
tant state interest." However, what is in question here is not so
much a disenfranchisement of citizens' votes, but rather a con-
cern over the degree of influence on the voter's choice. Conse-
quently, the interest may not be considered sufficiently
compelling. 2 Thus, strictly speaking, piercing the level of pro-
tection afforded speech in order to prevent a fraction of the
10. This would be true under either first amendment or equal protection clause
analysis. Id. at 385 n.6. Here, the particular type of speech under scrutiny was the
discussion of election results and the particular speakers, exit pollsters and broadcast-
ers. However, arguably there should only be relaxed scrutiny in that the purpose
ultimately is not to suppress expression, but to preserve the integrity of the election.
Where the purpose is not to suppress expression, there is not strict scrutiny. See Note,
Exit Polls and the First Amendment, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1927, 1932 n.30 (1985).
11. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982). As Congress put it in H.R. Con Res.
321(4), 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CoNG. REC. 2063 (1984): "[E]arly projections under-
mine belief of individuals in the importance of their votes - a belief that is essential
in a democratic society." The weighted vote of those voters living in a certain part of
the country may be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment
and the one man, one vote concept. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964);
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972).
Congress, on another occasion, found this interest a compelling one: "[A] decline in
voter participation is an unacceptable trend for a healthy, vibrant political environ-
ment .... [IThe right of American[s] to cast informed and educated votes is the cor-
nerstone of our democracy and freedom of the press is intended to further that basic
right .... Congress has a compelling interest and inherent duty to protect the voting
rights of all Americans and to seek an increase in participation in the electoral process
....." H.R. Con. Res. 395,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (emphasis added). See also Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at 561-62 (1964) for proposition that voting is a fundamental
constitutional right.
12. In Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex reL La Follette, 450
U.S. 107, 124-26 (1981), the Supreme Court held in effect that a state's interest in
preserving the overall integrity of the electoral process did not justify infringement
on first amendment rights. The state wanted to require Democratic delegates to the
National Convention to be bound to cast votes in the same allocations as the state-
wide primary, but the Democratic Party successfully argued that this impaired the
Party's freedom of political association. This puts in some doubt the prospects of the
Supreme Court upholding a suppression of returns, given that the first amendment
interest here seems less pressing than in Daily Herald, and yet still prevailed.
However, one distinguishing factor of Democratic Party was state interference into
national politics, and this is absent in the Daily Herald situation. Furthermore, as
Professor Tribe has stated, "[w]hile the majority's rationale for refusing to character-
ize Wisconsin's interests as 'compelling' seems flawed, the Court could have easily
repeated its reasoning in Cousins - that an individual state has an insufficient inter-
est of the selection of candidates in national elections." TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU.
TIONAL LAW 1115 n.21 (2d ed. 1988).
Indeed, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976), the Court found the federal gov-
ernment's interest in preventing corrupt practices from ruining an election compel-
ling enough to justify an incidental restriction on the first amendment. (The Court
therein upheld the constitutionality of some provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
1988] 1157
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population from thinking that their vote does not mean any-
thing does not seem likely to be acceptable. As such, the court
was probably right in reaching its conclusion that the first
amendment must prevail. However, in looking at the court's
reasoning, it can be seen that it is far from clear that this
should necessarily be the result.
The court cites just two cases to support its argument that
insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to jus-
tify suppressing speech. The first and weightiest one is Mills v.
Alabama.'3 Though this United States Supreme Court case
may stand for the insulation proposition in general, a close
reading of the case suggests that the particular factual setting
and issues involved were dispositiveA4 In Mills, a state statute
made it a crime for a newspaper editor to publish on election
day an editorial urging people to vote in a particular way. This
drastic criminalization of opinion in Mills, however, is not the
same as temporarily suspending the release of facts, as is the
case in Daily Herald, because there is neither a crime involved
nor any attempt to silence opinion or debate.
The Court pointed out that the question in Mills "in no way
involves the extent of a state's power to regulate conduct in and
around the polls in order to maintain peace, order and decorum
there."' 5 On the contrary, in Daily Herald the state argued
that the purpose of the legislation was to prevent disruption at
the polls caused by the effect of broadcasting the results.16
That is, seeking to preserve the decorum or integrity of an elec-
tion by not releasing the vote until everybody has voted is not
the same thing as the suppression of all debate on the issues.
To the extent that the delay of returns is only an attempt to
ensure that each person's vote counts, the Mills court did not
suggest that the states would not be free to regulate.17
Although it can be argued that prohibiting election news for
the suppressed period also stifles debate, inasmuch as opinions
paign Act.) To what degree, therefore, federal legislation might fare better than state
legislation is left open to speculation.
13. 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
14. In Daily Herald the court did no more than cite to the case. It did not explain
why Mills was apposite other than to state its conclusion that insulating voters was
just as unconstitutional in the case of suppressing early broadcasting returns as it was
with prohibiting election day broadcasts or newspaper editorials.
15. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218.
16. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 385.
17. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218-20.
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are not valuable without any facts to support them, the intent
of the Washington legislature was not to suppress debate."8
The media is still free to express its opinion on election day and
the effect on debate is only indirect. The main issue is the ques-
tion of the press' right to factual information. The press may
not have the same automatic right of access to facts as it does to
expression of its opinion. 9
Daily Herald also differs from Mills in regard to the type of
influence sought to be imposed on the voter.20 In Mills, the
voter's choice of candidates was to be influenced.' In Daily
18. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 385.
19. Though a right of access to information has been found to exist in proceedings
open to the public, see generally, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555
(1980), it is not clear the extent to which this extends to other areas, particularly
where there is dispute as to whether the right of access in Richmond Newspapers
derives from the first amendment or from the public nature of criminal trials. (There
was no majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers; C.J. Burger took the latter posi-
tion, J. Brennan, the former.) Furthermore, where government has shown a counter-
vailing compelling interest, a right of access has been limited. See, e.g., Snepp v.
United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (national security); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 17 (1965) ("right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
to gather information"); and KPNX Broadcasting Co. v. Arizona Superior Court, 459
U.S. 1302, 1306-08 (1982) (Rehnquist, Circuit Justice) (criminal defendant's right to a
fair trial).
Surely here too is a situation where the countervailing interest in the workings of
the democratic system being at stake must prevail. See H.R. Con. Res. 395,98th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1984) (Congress found predictions to be lacking in social function. In other
words, this is not a case where the media is facilitating debate on the issues; rather, it
is reporting something on election day that it could equally well do on the next day.
Nobody in the political process will suffer, as was true in Mills.).
Though the court did not specifically reach this issue in Daily Herald, it did say that
it did "not agree with the state that the conduct here would not be entitled to protec-
tion under the right of access' cases.... 838 F.2d at 384 n.3. The concurrence thought
the law did impermissibly restrict the media's right of access. Id. at 389-90. However,
like the majority, it did not say why broadcasting of returns the day of the election
was necessary to fostering public debate. Part of the reason for this decision, how-
ever, may have been that the judge was considering the larger concern of the statute
as a whole, and not specifically the purpose of delaying broadcasting of returns. Con-
sequently, an additional concern over other uses of the information discovered by
polls arises, such as to find out why people voted the way they did. Id. at 387. This
concern would not be present in a narrowly drawn statute. As a result, the balancing
in right of access might change.
20. The reporting of election results is significantly different from political cam-
paigns, where "the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent applica-
tion." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
A contrary view might be that it is questionable whether election predictions based
on returns differ in any degree from earlier preference polls throughout the campaign
in producing voter apathy. If the latter are protected, even if they cause such apathy,
why should not the election night predictions be protected? See Note, Exit Polls and
the First Amendment, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1927, 1941 n.85 (1985).
21. Mills, 384 U.S. at 216.
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Herald the influence sought to be exerted was not over the vot-
ers' political choice or opinion, but over the decision whether or
not to vote at all. Thus, the prohibition of announcing early
returns should not hurt any of the candidates, as was the con-
cern in Mills where one side necessarily lost out. Indeed, that
this kind of factual reporting might be prohibited was not en-
tirely refuted by Mills.2 The U.S. Supreme Court suggested
that what was unconstitutional about the law was only that the
state acted arbitrarily in allowing charges up to election day,
which could not then be answered on election day. Such dead-
lines on debate are arbitrary because they are inherently unfair
since no cut off date could work.23
Mills, therefore, does not provide a rationale for the Daily
Herald decision because Mills did not address the counter-
vailing interest in protecting the integrity of the electoral pro-
cess.2 4 In Mills, the integrity of the election itself was not at
issue; the state merely used the integrity of the election argu-
ment as a justification for the otherwise restrictive law in ques-
tion. The Daily Herald court also cites Vanasco v. Schwartz2
for the proposition that preserving the integrity of the electoral
process is not a sufficiently compelling state interest. As in
Mills, the subject in Vanasco was the severe consequences of
prohibiting debate. It did not have to do with the running of
the election itself. As the court said, "Nothing in our decision
downgrades the State's legitimate interest in insuring fair and
honest elections. '26
The argument that just because there are risks attached to
freedom, these risks do not give government the right to dictate
what will be heard, is at the heart of the opposition to election
regulation in these cases.2' Citing Vanasco, the court in Daily
Herald stated, "[w]hen the state through the guise of protecting
22. As the Alabama Supreme Court stated in Mills, "[i]t is a salutary legislative
enactment that protects the public from confusive last minute charges... in an effort
to influence voters on an election day; when as a practical matter, because of lack of
time, such matters cannot be answered or their truth determined until after the elec-
tion is over." Mills, 384 U.S. at 219-220.
23. Ld.
24. Id. at 218-20.
25. 401 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) aff'd mem, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976).
26. Id., 401 F. Supp. at 100.
27. See 1st National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (prohibiting
state curtailment of corporate sponsorship of election, where alleged rationale was
that citizens might not be able to evaluate the corporate information); Daily Herald,
758 F.2d at 363 (Norris, J. dissenting) (earlier opinion) (1st Amendment in guarantee-
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the citizen's right to a fair and honest election tampers with
what it will permit the citizen to see and hear even that impor-
tant state interest must give way to the irresistible force of pro-
tected expression under the first amendment."' 8
To some degree by suppressing election returns, states are
tampering with the availability of information and thereby tak-
ing away people's responsibilities.- However, the tampering is
only temporary and even during that time the people are still
left to decide the merits for themselves. 3° Furthermore, what
is being achieved is ensuring that each person has a chance to
properly express his opinion through his vote."1 Therefore, it
may be a limiting of the media's speech in the short term, but
the more important speech, the people's vote, is being protected
in the long term.3 2
Furthermore, there are several instances where it has been
considered perfectly acceptable for government to insulate peo-
ple from speech because of the fear that if it did not, people
might not be able to determine the truth for themselves.3 For
example, laws regulating offensive speech have been found
ing free speech does not leave open to government the choice of suppressing informa-
tion about the electoral process).
28. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 387. See also Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982)
(The Court held that the state interest in protecting an election was not met, for pur-
poses of a compelling state interest, when it did not give sufficient breathing space for
candidates' debate, such that a promise to help taxpayers money-wise was considered
a bribe so as to invalidate his candidacy.). According to Tribe, a state law like this is
trying to balance competing concerns: on one hand, that government not be allowed to
perpetuate its power by controlling political campaigns, and on the other, that voters
not lose power to make a reasoned choice by the election degenerating due to no regu-
lation. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1130-31.
29. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 386.
30. The statute limits the restrictions to "the day of any primary, general or spe-
cial election" and does not address how people should vote, only how pollsters should
conduct themselves. WASH. REV. CODE § 29.51.020(1)(e).
31. The state argued that election day broadcasting affected voters' decisions
about whether to vote, and that the state had a significant interest in preventing this
influence on voting behavior. Daily Herald, 838 F.2d at 837.
32. In this regard, the press has no greater right of access to information than
those of the people generally. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 684 (1972). If any-
thing, the press' rights may be less inasmuch as its voice is not that of the public, but
only of its representative. In any event, as Tribe has suggested, "rights relating to the
franchise stand poised between procedural due process.., and the first amendment
..... " TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1062, and, consequently, may have just as important a
constitutional interest as that of the press.
33. As Tribe has stated, "[t]here is little doubt that a state's interest in purging
political campaigns of deceptive content far outweighs any marginal interest in dis-
seminating false or misleading information. . .. " TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1131. He also
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constitutional even though they restrict speech, on the ground
that people might not be able to completely turn their eyes
aways4 and might be upset by it. As there is some precedent for
government channeling of information even when the counter-
vailing government concerns are not that strong, it is not clear
to this author why states cannot seek to ensure that an election
is not tainted by the media while it is still going on. The only
assurance we have now that elections will not be influenced by
broadcasting of early election returns is an unenforceable
promise from the three major networks that they will not
broadcast returns of any state before that state has closed its
polls.
David J. Cowan
states that courts have upheld restrictions on campaign practices so that the electorate
can "make a reasoned choice among the candidates." Id at 1129-30.
As is true in the commercial context, unfair competition laws in general, and trade-
mark laws in particular, exist because of concern that consumers might otherwise be
deceived as to the source of the product. See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 562
F.2d 749, 758-59 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
464-65 (1978) (in reference to attorney solicitation).
34. See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986),
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12. (1975).
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